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Abstract 
The Relationship between Decision-Making Style and Negative Affect in College 
Students 
Annemarie F. Schoemaker 
Arthur Nezu 
The present study looked at the relationship between decision-making style and 
negative affect in college students. Following a literature review it is clear that although 
there is research regarding the relationship between decision-making and affect, the 
majority of the work within the decision-making literature has focused on the relationship 
between transitory affective states (e.g. happy or sad), cognitive processes, and decision-
making behavior. Thus, it is important to conduct research to understand how 
pathological affective states, like depression and anxiety, influence decision-making 
behavior. 
Seventy-six Drexel University undergraduate students were recruited to 
participate in the present study. The participants were asked to complete three measures, 
including the General Decision-Making Style Inventory, the Beck Depression Inventory-
Second Edition, and the Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire-Fomth Edition. 
The hypothesis for this study was that there will be decision-making styles that are 
specific to depression and others that are specific to anxiety. Correlation and partial 
correlation analyses were run to determine whether relationships between decision-
making style and negative affect exist. 
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The correlation analyses revealed that depressive symptoms were significantly 
related to avoidant decision-making style and rational decision-making style in the 
predicted direction. However, the other predicted relationships were not supported as 
there were no significant relationships between depressive and anxious symptoms and the 
intuitive, spontaneous, and dependent decision-making styles. Furthermore, partial 
correlation analyses reveal that the only relationship remaining signifIcant was between 
depressive symptoms and avoidant decision-making style after controlling for anxious 
symptoms. Further investigations utilizing more complex statistical methods and 
additional measures of decision-making and negative affect are necessary to better 
understand the relationship between decision-making and pathological affective states. 
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1. LITERATURE REVIEW AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 Introduction 
Decision-making is a construct linked to human behavior and thus receives 
scientific consideration in the field of psychology. The premise underlying decision 
research is that the decisions we make on a daily basis shape our lives. Decision-makers 
are required to make effectivc decisions to adapt to the changing environment, maintain 
social competence, and reach goals (Nezu & Ronan, 1987; Hastie, 2001). However, many 
circumstances interfere with the decision-making process and influence the quality and 
adaptability of decisions. The generation, evaluation, and selection of an appropriate 
decision among several alternatives require a decision-maker to take into account many 
factors (Medin et a!. 2004). For instance, the decision-maker must account for situational 
factors (e.g. risk and uncertainty), personal factors (e.g. personal values, expectations, 
and knowledge), and practical factors (e.g. the utility of a particular decision) when 
approaching a set of alternatives (Hastie, 2001; Medin et a!. 2004; Nezu & Ronan, 1987). 
Thus, the aim of decision research is to identify how these factors interfere (interact) with 
the decision-making process and subsequently provide suggestions for dealing with the 
complexity inherent in decision-making. 
Given that decision-making is a fundamental component of adaptive behavior, 
optimizing decision-making behavior is an important topic of research in psychology. 
However, decision research is somewhat disconnected in that each subfield of 
psychology conducts experiments and applies knowledge about decision processes to 
problems speciEc to that subEeld. For instance, cognitive psychologists look at how 
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neurological damage impairs decision-making and tries to pinpoint neural networks that 
need to be repaired; clinical psychologists seek to understand the relationship between 
deficits in decision-making and psychopathology such that therapeutic interventions can 
target these deficits; applied psychologists look at decision-making as it relates to 
managerial and consumer behavior to optimize entities like profit (Nezu, 2004). This 
dichotomy between subfields limits the application of science to practice and limits the 
utility ofinfonnation about decision-making. Therefore, regardless of the purpose of the 
decision research-- the application of empirical findings to other problems in psychology 
should be considered and convergence among the literatures sought after. 
The purpose of discussing this dichotomy among literatures that address decision-
making is directly related to the goal of the present study. Upon reviewing the decision-
making literature we found that many characteristics of the individual (e.g. cognitive 
processing tendencies) that are integral to decision-making processes were also 
characteristics that determine the presence or absence of psychopathology. For instance, 
current decision research assesses emotions and cognitions that arise in response to 
decision situations and looks at how they influence the decision-makers behavior. 
However, the findings related to how decision behavior is influenced by affect are based 
primarily on an assessment of a normal range of emotions and (unbiased) cognitive 
processing. Only a few studies in clinical and decision psychology have explicitly 
addressed the differential effects on decision behavior of a normal affective range (and 
thus normal cognitive processing) and pathological afIective states (and biased cognitive 
processes). 
4 
Thus our goal is to conduct a preliminary exploration to determine if there is in 
fact any significant relationship between decision-making behavior (e.g. decision-making 
style) and negative alTect (e.g. depressive symptomology and generalized anxiety 
symptomology). This exploration is based on an analysis of decision-related information 
from each subfleld of psychology and a subsequent synthesis of this information across 
fields to begin to understand some possible overlap. Although the goal of this study is 
not to find a definitive answer regarding any causal relationship between decision-
making style and psychopathology, it is a starting point. 
The review will begin with an overview of the following topics in the decision-
making literature in order to elicit general inferences about the role of affect in decision-
making: (I) the development of original decision-making theories; (2) studies examining 
the role of emotion in decision-making; and (3) theories debating whether emotion serves 
as information or misinformation in decision-making. 
1.2 Decision-Making 
1.2.1 Decision-Making Theories 
Decision-making theories were developed as analytical techniques to assist 
decision-makers with making a choice among alternatives. The original decision theories 
such as, expected value theory and subjective expected utility theory were founded on 
principles of rationality and assess decision behavior in quantitative terms (Edwards & 
Fasolo, 2001; Medin et al. 2004). These theories are based on the premise that a decision-
maker can impartially scan alternatives and compute probabilities to determine which 
alternative produces the maximum utility (Edwards and Fasolo, 2001; Finucane et al. 
2000; Hastie, 2001). Essentially, the decision-maker is assumed to have the ability to 
integrate multiple, fallible, incomplete, and sometimes conflicting information from the 
external world in an algebraic manner and come up with a decision that adheres to the 
principles of rationality (e.g. value) (Hastie, 200 1). 
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The preceding normative theories have clear limitations. The limitations and 
criticisms stem from the contention that our analytic and rational abilities are insufficient 
to deal with the complexity of a decision task (Hastie, 2001; Medin et al. 2004). Making 
a decision based solely on explicit, rule-based, or controlled cognitive processes is not 
realistic because implicit and automatic cognitive processes inevitably influence the 
decision process (Hastie, 200 I). A human decision-maker cannot realistically conform to 
the requirements of rationality being that many factors influence what represents an 
optimal decision (Medin et al. 2004). Elements of the decision task and the decision-
makers perception of these elements will influence decision behavior. For instance, an 
individual's evaluation of choice alternatives can be influenced by characteristics of the 
alternatives (e.g. risk and uncertainty), the context in which the alternatives are presented 
(e.g. context effect), or different presentations of the same information (e.g. framing 
effect) (Medin et al. 2004; Mellers et al. 1998). Thus normative theories have been 
extended to deal with these complexities. More recent theories address the role of these 
situational factors and cognitive processes on (he overall computational process involved 
in decision-making. 
However, the primary interest of the present paper is the roles that affect plays in 
the decision-making processes. So although there are many factors related to the decision 
task, e.g. framing effects and context efTects that influence decision making; our focus is 
on how affect influences cognitive appraisals of a decision situation and hence decision-
making behavior. Therefore, the following overview of non-normative decision-making 
theories will illustrate how implicit and automatic affective reactions are integral to the 
decision process and influence the decision-makers behavior. 
1.2.2 Decision-Making and Emotion 
Normative theories viewed emotions as a by-product of the computation process. 
However, more recent research has addressed emotions as being integral to the 
computational process. Emotions are thought to influence cognitive processes and 
subsequent decision behavior. This influence is dependent on whether the emotions are 
positive or negative and whether they are related or unrelated to the decision task 
(Lewicka, 1997; Pham, 2007). 
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After reviewing the literature regarding the role of emotion in decision-making 
the major conclusions are as follows. The type of mood effects cognitive processes--
mood congruent cognitive processing of decision-related information occurs and drives 
decision behavior accordingly. For instance, research consistently suggests that a 
decision-maker in a positive mood utilizes more global information processing, rules of 
thumb, flexibility, and creativity (Lcwicka 1997; Pham & Ragunathan, 1999). 
Alternatively, a decision-maker with negative affect is more systematic, analytic, logical, 
and reality-anchored when processing information about a decision situation (Lewicka, 
1997; Mellers et aI., 1998). 
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Additionally, different types/levels of negative or positive moods have also been 
found to influence decision-making processes. For instance, Ragunathan and Pham 
(1999) compared sad and anxious individuals-- two negative affective states, each of a 
different valence. Findings indicate that sad participants seek higher risk-higher reward 
choices whereas anxious participants make low risk-low reward choices (Raghunathan & 
Pham, 1999). These findings indicate that behavior is consistent with the goals inherent 
in a particular mood. 
Essentially, a decision-maker in a negative mood is likely to act in a way that 
changes their mood state whereas a decision-maker in a positive mood is more risk 
aversive because they want to maintain their mood state (Lewicka, 1997). These and 
other similar findings imply that people make biased decisions as a result of their 
affective state and that the type of bias is dependent on the valence of that affective state. 
The preceding findings regarding the type of emotion and its effect on decision-making 
are based on a normal affective range and thus might not hold for pathological levels of 
affect. The potential for differential effects on decision-making depending on the type of 
negative affect will be explored throughout the paper. 
Another way that emotions have been found to influence cognitive processes and 
subsequent decision behavior are their relationship to the decision situation. To illustrate 
this concept we will look at Pham (2007) conceptualization of emotions related and 
unrelated to the target, i.e. the decision. Pham (2007) distinguishes between integral and 
incidental emotions. Emotions that are related to the target object are integral emotions 
and those unrelated to the target object are incidental emotions. This distinction is 
important to consider because research indicates that people respond to their cognitive 
appraisal of a stimulus rather than the stimulus itself (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). 
Essentially, the same event can elicit different reactions depending on the cognitive 
appraisal. 'I'he implication of this interpretation of the relationship between affect and 
cognition is that a cognitive appraisal is the antecedent to behavior. Therefore, it can be 
hypothesized that the cognitive appraisals of an individual with some underlying 
psychopathology (e.g. depression or anxiety) would have different behavioral responses 
to the same stimulus than an individual without any psychopathology. 
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Integral emotions arc emotions that are related to the decision task. This type of 
emotion arises as a result of characteristics of the decision situations, for example fear 
results when the decision choices all involve risk (Pha111, 2007). Integral emotions playa 
role in the evaluations oj~ decisions about, and behavior toward the decision situation. 
Decisions made based on integral emotions are usually made more rapidly because they 
require less processing. Integral affective responses are the initial response to the decision 
situation and set off a (cognitive) search for information that confirms and supports the 
initial affective response (Pham, 2007). Decisions based on integral affect are not usually 
reflective of maximum utility or value but rather reflect the desire to regulate the 
emotional states discussed above-- e.g. sad versus happy. 
Alternatively, incidental emotions are emotions that are not caused by the 
presence of a decision task. Rather incidental emotions are "pre-existing mood states" 
and "enduring emotional dispositions", such as chronic anxiety (Pham, 2007). This type 
of emotion is important to consider in terms of decision-making because of the potential 
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for misattribution of these pre-existing mood states to the current decision task. These 
misattributions of an emotion to the decision task that is in fact a pre-existing emotional 
predisposition can result in decisions that don't necessarily reflect maximum utility but 
rather misperceptions about how the individual feels about the decision situation (Pham, 
2007). This is important to consider because of the interaction between affect and 
cognitive processing that occurs when making a decision-- an affective state 
misattributed to the decision task will cause cognitive evaluations that are in line with the 
affect and not the actual features of the current decision. 
The combined effect of both the type of emotion and the relationship of the 
emotion to the decision task follows. Mild negative incidental emotional states (e.g. 
sadness) lead to more logical and organized forms of reasoning whereas mild positive 
moods promote more creative and flexible forms of reasoning (Pham, 2007). 
Alternatively, intense incidental emotional states impair cognitive processes (e.g. 
information recall) causing a divergence from rationality (Pham, 2007). 
Integral emotions affect decisions through their influence on evaluations of, 
decisions about, and behavior toward objects. Integral emotions lead to biased processing 
of information, which in turn leads to decision behavior that does not reflect value 
judgments (Pham, 2007). Essentially, this research suggests that an individual makes 
decisions that will regulate some current emotional state or that reflect an emotion 
completely unrelated to the decision situation. Therefore, normative principles of 
rationality are complicated by emotions that influence cognitive processes, which in turn 
might produce decision behavior that does not reflect optimality. 
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The preceding information is important in terms of the present study because the 
majority of the research has focused on the influence a normal range of emotions on 
decision-making behavior. However, it is logical to assume that pathological emotions 
will affect cognitive processes and subsequent behavior in a different way. In support of 
this notion, Raghunathan and Pham (1999) have discussed the possibility that the 
influence an affective state has on decision behavior is related to its chronicity-- a chronic 
affective states might lose "predictive diagnosticity" in terms of decision-making. This 
possibility is in line with theories regarding affective influence on behavior in the clinical 
literature (e.g. pathological affective states cause a divergence in cognitive processing; 
normal emotions are in unison with cognitive processing). 
The affective and cognitive influences on behavior are quite different in the 
decision-making literature than in the cognitive psychology literature. First, theories 
regarding the role of affect in decision-making will be reviewed. These theories focus on 
a normal range of affect, the interaction between affect and cognitive processes, and the 
influence of this cognitive processing on behavior. Then, theories that address 
pathological affective states will be reviewed. It will become apparent that theories 
regarding the role of affect in behavior (mediated by cognitive processes) will differ a 
great deal depending on the nature of the affective state (normal versus pathological). 
1.2.3 Models Regarding the Role of Affect in Decision-Making 
The work in this area is controversial in that there is research to support emotion 
as valuable and as harmful in decision behavior. It is our contention that emotion is not 
always helpful or always harmful. Rather, emotion is sometimes helpful and sometimes 
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harmful depending on the source of the emotion (e.g. related to the situation or pre-
existing). The majority of the models presented in this section, which are found in the 
decision psychology literature, address how emotion informs decision. It is in the clinical 
literature that theory suggests that emotion has a destructive influence on decision-
making. This discrepancy in the utility of emotion in decision-making speaks to the 
discrepancy in the "type" and "relationship" of the emotion discussed in the previous 
section--"Decision Making and Emotion". The majority of this section focuses on 
emotions as "helpful". Some of the later sections that focus on pathological affective 
states (e.g. depression and generalized anxiety) bring into play theories about how 
emotions are destructive to cognitive processing and behavior (decision behavior). 
Winkielman et al. (2007) provides an overview of the major models of affective 
influence on decision-making. This overview groups these models into two major 
categories: (1) associative models, which assert that affective influence on deeision-
making is the result of activation in a memory or motor network, and (2) inferential 
models, which contend that the inferences an individual makes about current or 
anticipated affective experiences will determine how affect influences decision-making 
(Winkielman et aI., 2007). The goal here is to understand the impact of an emotion on 
different systems that in turn drive behavior. 
The associative models include semantic memory model and action model. The 
semantic memory model is hased on the premise that "affective states are linked to 
related cognitive categories within a network of semantic memory" (Winkielman et al 
2007). This model is consistent with the literature that addresses I) how affect influences 
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processes such as the encoding and retrieval of information and 2) how affect influences 
perception, reasoning, and judgment. Essentially, the semantic memory model brings 
together the work done on cognitive processes and emotion in the decision and cognitive 
psychology literature. The action model looks at emotional priming within a motor 
activation network. In other words, how does the valence of an emotion influence motor 
activation (Winkelman 2007). However, the motor activation is not of relevance to the 
present study and will not be discussed further. 
Both of the associative models are based on the premise that affect influences 
behavior automatically and without reference to the context of the decision situation or 
the characteristics of the decision-maker (Winkielman et aI2007). Inferential models on 
the other hand propose that the decision-maker is an active observer of his or her 
emotions and their relationship to the decision situation (Winkielman et a!., 2007). Thus 
affective influence on behavior is driven by characteristics of the decision-maker--
perceptions, values, beliefs. The major inferential models include the affect-as-
information hypothesis and affect regulation model (Winkielman et a!., 2007). Theories 
exhibiting similar characteristics as the inferential models Winkielman et a!. (2007) 
addresses are the affect heuristic and the somatic marker hypothesis. 
The inferential models essentially look at emotional reactions to a decision task as 
information that guides decision behavior. Similarly, these models rest on the assumption 
that emotional reactions and cognitive reactions are complementary and help the 
decision-maker to evaluate the decision alternatives (Loewenstein et a!., 2001). 
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The affect-as-information hypothesis contends that affective states influence 
judgments when that state is a reaction to the target of judgment (Martin & Clore, 2001). 
The affective state that arises is a normal and adaptive feeling that is representative of 
emotional appraisals and in turn serves as information for decision-making (Matlin & 
Clore, 2001; Winkielman et al 2007). However, the risk is that an individual accidentally 
mistakes a pre-existing affective state (or emotion) as a feeling related to the object of 
judgment (the decision) (Loewenstein et aI, 200 I). This phenomenon could potentially 
cause the decision-maker to choose based on misattributions of an affective state that is 
unrelated to the decision task (Martin & Clore, 2001; Loewenstein et a!. 2001). 
The affect regulation model is based on the notion that decisions are influenced 
by affect because people make particular decisions with the intention of managing 
feelings (Winkielman et a!. 2007). The three emotional goals that tend to drive decisions 
are the desire to maintain, change, or remove an emotional state. For instance, sadness 
may promote active seeking of reward, while fear motivates the need to reduce the 
uncertainty of the situation (Pham & Ragunathan, 1999). 
The somatic marker hypothesis and research supporting it suggests that decision-
making is guided by somatic reactions to information about decision alternatives 
(Damasio, 1994). These somatic reactions provide automatic and basic affective input 
that guides the decision-maker (Loewenstein et a!., 2001; Damasio, 1994). These 
affective reactions to the decision task then guide the deeper levels of cognitive 
processing required to make an informed decision (Loewenstein et a!., 2001). The 
somatic marker hypothesis provides insight into how affective reactions and cognitive 
processes work together to inform decision-making. 
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The availability heuristic is used to make decisions based on information that is 
readily brought to mind (Medin et al. 2004). These heuristics often reflect a decision-
makers habits or personal values that when unbiased can aide in dealing with complexity 
and reaching a decision in an efficient manner (Mellers et al. 2001; Medin et al. 2004). 
However, biases that have the potential to manifest in heuristics can lead to incorrect 
conclusions about the utility of a particular decision and produce unfavorable 
consequences for the decision-maker. 
A model that also rests on the principle that emotions can inform the decision 
process is the Rational-Emotional Model (REM) (Anderson, 2003). REM deals 
particularly with the concept of decision avoidance as it relates to both normative 
principles of decision-making (e.g. cost-benefit calculations) and affective influences 
(e.g. anticipatory and anticipated negative emotions) on decision-making. The model was 
developed based on what Anderson (2003) identifies as the antecedents and 
consequences of decision avoidance. In addition, mediating variables and irrelevant 
antecedents are considered (Anderson, 2003). The overhauling assumption of REM is 
that emotional experiences (both present and predicted future emotions) do not directly 
affect decision behavior. Anderson (2003) contends that the role of emotion in decision 
behavior is directly related to regulating a negative emotional state, which in turn might 
drive the type of decision made. The occurrence of affective regulation presents the 
possibility that a decision-maker might choose an alternative that diminishes an 
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undesirable emotional state (e.g. fear) despite optimality of the choice (Anderson, 2003). 
However, REM holds that rational inferences based on probability and anticipated and 
anticipatory emotions can be factored into the computational process without negating 
normative principles of decision-making. 
Two accounts of when affective reactions diverge from cognitive evaluations and 
thus have a destructive inHuence on decision-making include the affect heuristic and the 
Risk-As-Feelings Model. The affect heuristic suggests that in some situations, e.g. when 
risk is involved in decision making, that emotional reactions can conflict with cognitive 
evaluations and produce poor decision behavior (Loewenstein et aI., 2001). For instance, 
when an emotional reaction to risk severity differs from one's cognitive evaluation of risk 
severity the emotional reaction dominates and thus influences decision behavior in a 
maladaptive direction (Loewenstein et aI., 2001). 
Similarly, the Risk-As-Feelings Model posited by Loewenstein et al. (2001) 
differs from REM primarily on the basis that affective experiences can mediate decision 
behavior directly (Loewenstein et aI., 2001; Anderson, 2003). Essentially, affective 
experiences (present and predicted) interact with the computational processes (e.g. cost-
benefit analyses) and mediate choice behavior (Anderson, 2003). This model addresses 
the two potential roles of emotion in decision-making and when and why each occurs--
(I) emotional reactions and cognitive evaluations work together to inform and guide 
decisions; (2) (anticipatory) emotional reactions diverge from cognitive evaluations and 
subsequently the emotional reaction dominates decision behavior (Loewenstein et aI., 
2001). Risk-as-feelings hypothesis puts forth the notion that: 
a) "feelings can arise without cognitive mediation (probabilities, outcomes, and 
other factors can give rise to feelings) and 
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b) "the impact of cognitive evaluations on behavior is mediated, at least in part, 
by affective response (cognitive evaluation gives rise to feelings that in turn affect 
behavior)". 
C)"emotional reactions guide responses not only at their first occurrence but also 
through conditioning and memory at later points in time, serving as somatic 
111arkers . .. ~, 
(Loewenstein, 2001) 
Essentially, emotions and cognitive processing are contingent on one another in that 
cognitive appraisals give rise to emotions and emotions influence appraisals even though 
each has its own determinant. 
These two accounts of the interaction between affect and cognitive processes 
provide a starting point for looking at decision-making and pathological affective states. 
The possibility that decision-making is influenced differently depending on whether the 
emotional reaction is followed by pathological or normal cognitive processes and the 
subsequent effect on decision behavior is important to consider. There is a clear link 
between these accounts of emotion in decision-making and cognitive theories of 
depression and anxiety. Emotional reactions to a decision situation depend on context 
factors and person factors and they guide both initial and future decision responses 
through conditioning and memory. 
However, the majority of the theories regarding the role of affect in decision-
making fail to differentiate between a normal range of emotional input and pathological 
emotions. In our view, this distinction is crucial for understanding when emotions are 
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helpful and when they are harmful in decision-making. Thus, these theories can be 
integrated with cognitive and hehavioral theories of depression and generalized anxiety to 
make predictions ahout how one's cognitive style will influence decision-making 
behavior (style). Essentially, it would he logical to extend these affect-decision'models to 
incorporate the influence of pathological affective states on decision-making. 
It is our prediction that individuals with pre-existing conditions like depression or 
generalized anxiety would approach a decision situation quite differently. In other words, 
the negative aflect that results fi'om these conditions would lead to a divergence from 
normal cognitive processing of information and move toward biased cognitive appraisals 
and maladaptive attitudes toward decision information, resulting in less than optimal 
decision behavior. For example, the semantic memory model asserts that affective states 
are linked to related cognitive categories in semantic memory. Thus, in a depressed 
individual a decision task might prime [negative] mood congruent memory recall of past 
failures that have been negatively reinforced through rumination, which in turn will lead 
to decision avoidance or a decision that will maintain the individuals negative self-
concept. A more in depth analysis of these differences in cognitive processing and 
attitudes towards information will be discussed in the context of cognitive theories of 
depression and generalized anxiety in the section labeled "Negative Affect". 
1.2.4 Decision-Making S(V1e 
Decision-making style is one of the constructs evaluated in the present study. In 
this seetion literature addressing characteristics of the decision-maker that influence 
decision processes will be addressed. The preceding sections discuss the literature on 
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how the characteristics of a decision situation (e.g. uncertainty and risk) and affective 
responses to these situations define decision behavior. Although we do not negate the 
importance of these situational factors in decision behavior there is evidence that suggests 
people possess a more general decision-making style. In other words, individuals possess 
a decision-making style that is carried across decision situations regardless of situational 
characteristics, such as importance of the decision, the risk involved, or the transitory 
affective responses that result from the characteristics inherent in the decision situation. 
Furthermore, based on the evidence that decision-making style reflects an individual's 
cognitive style we suggest that it is important to consider the effects of psychopathology 
on decision-making, specifIcally maladaptive decision-making stylcs. 
Recent research in the area of decision-making style has progressed in terms of 
identifying some individual differences, namely cognitive styles that influence decision-
making beyond the decision task and environment (Scott and Bruce, 1995; Thunholm, 
2004; Loo 2000; Gaiotti et al. 2006; Spicer and Sadler-Smith, 2005). Several researchers 
had started to formulate theories about the relationship between individual factors such as 
information gathering style and attitudes and decision behavior (Thunholm, 2004). 
However, Scott and Bruce (1995) synthesized this information to propose a definition of 
decision-making style, which in turn lead to the development of a method for measuring 
decision-making style in behavioral terms. Scott and Bruce's (1995) defIned decision-
making as: 
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"the learned habitual response pattern exhibited by an individual when confronted 
with a decision situation. It is not a personality trait, but a habit-based propensity 
to react in a certain way in a specific decision context". 
This definition suggests that stable individual differences produce a consistent approach 
to decisions regardless of other circumstances. Based on this definition, Scott and Bruce 
(J 995) developed the General Decision Making Style (GDMS) inventory, which 
incorporates five decision-making styles: (I) rational, (2) intuitive, (3) avoidant, (4) 
spontaneous, and (5) dependent. 
These decision-making styles are conceptualized in behavioral terms in order to 
make studying differences between decision-makers possible (Scott and Bruce, 1995). 
Rational style is a logical and structural approach to decision making. Spontaneous style 
identifies an individual that is prone to make "snap" or "spur of the moment" decisions. 
Avoidant style characterizes individuals that tend to postpone or avoid making decisions. 
Individuals exhibiting an intuitive decision making style are reliant upon hunches, 
impressions and feeling. Finally, dependent decision makers rely on the direction and 
support of others (Spicer & Sadler-Smith, 2005). 
The evidence for the relationship between the preceding decision-making styles 
and individual cognitive style comes from several studies that looked at the relationship 
between decision-making style and constructs that evaluate various individual 
differences. Scott and Bruce (J 995) looked at the relationship between control orientation 
and decision-making style. Thunholm (2004) investigated the relationship between 
decision-making style and the following four individual characteristics: self-esteem, 
action control, educative ability, and social desirability. GaIotti et al. (2006) evaluated the 
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relationship between decision-making style and an individual's attitudes toward thinking 
and learning. Loo (2000) looked at decision-making style in relationship to social 
desirability, conf1ict-management style, and value ratings. 
The study conducted by Scott and Bruce (1995) provides evidence that decision-
making style is significantly correlated with control orientation. Positive correlations 
were identified among rational decision-making style and internal locus of control, 
dependent decision-making style and external locus of control, and avoidant decision-
making style and external control orientation. However, minimal correlations were 
identified between spontaneous and intuitive decision-making styles and control 
orientation (Scott and Bruce, 1995). These findings suggest that the degree to which 
people feel control over their own destiny is associated with their decision behavior 
(Thunholm, 2004). According to the Scott and Bruce (1995) study rational decision-
makers attribute their destiny to factors inside themselves whereas dependent and 
avoidant decision makers don't feel control over their own destiny and attribute what 
happens to them to external factors. 
Thunholm (2004) found significant relationships between self-esteem and action 
control. Action control (volatility versus persistence), earning self-esteem through hard 
work, and social desirability each predicted a rational decision-making style (all three 
together accounted for 20% of the variability). Independently no variable predicted 
intuitive decision-making style but combined predicted 10% of the variability for 
intuitive decision-making style. Dependent decision-making style was predicted by three 
variables independently: action control (preoccupation versus disengagement), self-
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esteem (aggression), and self-esteem (power) and together these variables accounted for 
16% of the variability in dependent decision-making style. 28% of the variability in 
avoidant decision-making style was accounted for by action control (hesitation versus 
initiative), self~esteem (aggression), and self-esteem (hard work) and each of these 
variables also independently predicted avoidance. Finally, social desirability was the only 
variable that predicted spontaneous decision-making style (Thunholm, 2004). These 
results suggest that both the habitual behavior of an individual and situational factors 
influence decision-making behavior. The implication being that decision models should 
incorporate individual differences in addition to decision situation factors when trying to 
understand decision processes. 
Loo (2000) also found that characteristics of the decision-maker are important to 
consider when evaluating decision behavior. Self-reported values were positively 
correlated with decision-making styles indicative of these values. For example, positive 
correlations were identified between values of social interaction and social relations and 
dependent decision-making style (Loo, 2000). Additionally these results signify that the 
GDMS has good construct validity. Loo (2000) also found that scores do not fall into the 
trap of response biases that could result from the phenomenon of responding in a way 
believed to increase social desirability. 
GaIotti et a!. (2006) study results suggest that the GDMS does not measure 
individual differences in information gathering and processing but rather individual 
differences in decision framing. These results are interesting to consider because they 
confirm that individual differences in decision-making style are independent of constructs 
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such as the amount of information considered prior to making a decision, which is 
consistent with normative decision-making models. But the study results do indicate that 
differences in decision-making style might reflect individual differences in the 
conceptualization of the decision (e.g. evaluation of consequences, values), which is 
consistent with both the other studies presented in this section and the hypothesis driving 
the present study. Essentially, individual differences that influence cognitive style (e.g. 
depression influences cognition through mood congruent recall) are important for 
predicting decision behavior (e.g. style). 
The findings from the preceding four studies are important because they prove 
that individual differences between decision-makers influence decision behavior. 
Furthermore, some of the findings support the notion that decision-making style is 
indicative of cognitive style, which is important for the present study. Spicer and Sadler-
Smith (2005) also address the notion that decision-making style reflects cognitive style 
due to individual differences that might influence one's approach to a decision task, such 
as that individuals processing capacity. Spice and Sadler-Smith (2005) attribute these 
stylistic differences to personality dimensions and suggest that decision-making might be 
a surface manifestation of more stable underlying dimensions, which will become 
important to consider in the discussion at the end of this section. 
Two additional findings that are important to consider are intercorrelations 
between subscales on the GDMS and gender. First, all of the above studies found 
significant correlations among scores on the subscales of the decision-making style 
measure. These fIndings suggest that decision-making styles are not completely 
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independent of one another. These findings indicate the simultaneous use of multiple 
styles by the decision-maker (Loo, 2000; Thunholm, 2004; Bruce and Scott, 1995; Spicer 
and Sadler-Smith, 2005). However, this does not mean that a decision-maker isn't 
defined by a primary decision-making style (Thunholm, 2004). Second, no gender 
differences were found in the relationship between decision-making style and the above-
mentioned constructs (Spicer and Sadler-Smith, 2005; Loo, 2000). 
The implication of the preceding findings is that decision-making style is more 
than a "habit-based propensity to respond in a particular way to a decision situation" as 
proposed by Scott and Bruce (1995). Decision-making style is the result of a combination 
of factors that vary fl'om individual to individual. Thunholm (2004) thus updates the 
definition of decision making style: 
'The response pattern exhibited by an individual in a decision-making situation. 
This response pattern is determined by the decision-making situation, the 
decision-making task and by the individual decision-maker. Individual differences 
between decision-makers include differences in habits but also differences in 
basic cognitive abilities such as information processing, self-evaluation and self-
regulation, which have a consistent impact on the response pattern across 
difference decisions-making tasks and situations." 
Based on this definition of decision-making style and the findings presented it is 
important to expand our knowledge of how individual differences drive decision-making 
style. Thus exploring the relationship between decision-making style and the maladaptive 
cognitions and attitudes characteristic of negative affective states like depression and 
generalized anxiety is justified. If decision-making style is a "habit-based propensity to 
react in a certain way in a specific decision context" (Scott and Bruce, 1995) and defined 
by "differences in basic cognitive abilities" (Thunholm, 2004) then it can be 
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hypothesized that there will be marked differences in decision-making styles between 
depressed and anxious individuals and their non-depressed and non-anxious counterparts. 
Identifying the differences in decision-making styles between symptomatic and non-
symptomatic populations can provide insight into the nature of these disorders (e.g. 
decision-making as a factor contributing to onset and recurrence of depression and 
generalized anxiety). Furthermore, patterns between cognitive style and decision-making 
style could provide additional therapeutic targets within problem-solving therapy. 
1.3 Negative Affect 
Cognitive theories purport that maladaptive cognitive styles and biases in 
cognitive and affective information processing are the defining characteristics of both 
depressive disorders and generalized anxiety disorder. Research evaluating the role of 
these cognitive processes in the onset, maintenance, and recurrence of depression and 
generalized anxiety are important for understanding decision-making style. Although 
decision-making research has looked at how emotions affect the decision process, there is 
a lack of research evaluating how pre-existing pathological emotions influence decision-
making (possibly through cognitive mediation). 
First, we will review the literature addressing the cognitive underpinnings of 
depression and generalized anxiety. Next, we will integrate the cognitive premises for 
these disorders with the decision-making literature that addresses affective influences on 
behavior and discuss the discrepancies. Finally, based on all the preceding information 
we will make predictions about how depression and generalized anxiety are associated 
with the subscales of the GDMS. 
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1.3.1 Depression 
Major depressive disorder (MOD) is the leading cause of disability in the United 
States for ages 14-44 (World Health Report, 2004) affecting approximately 14.8 million 
adults in a given year (Kessler et aI, 2005). The persistence of depressive symptoms is in 
large part what makes MOD the leading cause of disability in the United States. At least 
60% of people experiencing a major depressive episode can be expected to have a second 
episode; and, with an increasing number of episodes the risk for recurrence increases 
(DSM-IV-TR, 2000). Approximately one-third of people experiencing a Major 
Depressive Episode will only experience paJ1iai recovery or not recover at all. 
Naturalistic studies suggest that after one year, 60% of the people who experience a 
major depressive episode willmcet either full (40%) or partial (20%) criteria for the 
illness (DSM-IV -TR, 2000) 
Given that only 14% of individuals will have a single isolated major depressive 
episode Judd (1997) elicits the importance of shifting our thinking about MOD as a 
primarily acute illness to conceptualizing MOD as a chronic illness (statistic: Angst, 1995 
as seen in Judd, 1997). It is beyond the scope of the present paper to discuss all the risk 
factors that are thought to contribute to both first onset and recurrence of MOD; however, 
it is our goal to dctermine whether one's global decision-making style is related to 
depressive symptoms. The major goal of the present study is to conduct a preliminary 
exploration to determine if decision-making style is associated with the depressive 
symptoms. Essentially, the biases in the cognitive processing of information that occur 
when a person is depressed will influence the way one processes information about a 
decision task and subsequently their decision behavior. 
1.3.2 Cognitive Theories o.lDepression 
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Cognitive theories of depression emphasize maladaptive thought processes, which 
contribute to both the onset and chronic nature of depression. The cognitive theories of 
depression that are the most relevant to the study ofthe relationship between decision-
making style and negative affect include: (1) Beck's cognitive theory, (2) hopelessness 
theory, (3) cognitive vulnerability hypothesis, and (4) theories about ruminative 
tendencies in depression. Based on the literature that assesses the role affect plays in 
decision-making we believe these theories highlight cognitive characteristics of 
depressed individuals that are likely to influence decision-making style. 
Cognitive theories purport that maladaptive thinking patterns produce depression. 
Furthermore, those with dysfunctional cognitive styles are hypothesized to be at 
increased risk for depression when experiencing negative life events. These cognitive 
theories of depression were originally developed by Aaron Beck and Martin Seligman. 
Beck's cognitive theory is based on the premise that automatic thoughts trigger 
depressive symptoms (Abramson, et al; 2005). Similarly, Seligman's hopelessness theory 
asserts that depression results from maladaptive cognitions regarding lack of control over 
life (Abramson, et al; 2005). The more recent conceptualization of the role of cognition in 
depression is referred to as the cognitive vulnerability hypothesis. In addition, the concept 
of rumination has gained a great deal of attention in terms of its role in maintaining 
depressive symptoms. 
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The hopelessness theory purports that a major risk factor for developing 
depression is the cognitive tendency to expect aversive outcomes. In addition, the 
individual feels little sense of control or ability to change the aversive situation 
(Abramson, et al; 2005). A person is likely to develop depressive, hopeless 
symptomatology when negative life events occur because they have a tendency to make 
three maladaptive judgments about thc negative event. First, the individual attributes the 
negative event to stable, global causes; second, the negative event is expected to lead to 
additional negative consequences; and third, the cause of the negative event is internally 
attributed (Abramson, et al; 2005). Essentially, a low perceived sense of control and high 
expectancy for negative outcomes places a person at risk to developing depression. 
Beck's cognitive theory purports that people with negative self-schemas are prone 
to depression because they maintain their maladaptive self-schema through negative 
views about themselves, the world, and the future. These negative views are called the 
negative cognitive triad, which generate a pessimistic approach to negative life events, 
thus activating and maintaining depression (Alloy et a!., 2000). Furthermore, these self-
schemas drive dysfunctional attitudes, e.g. "my self-worth is dependent on perfectionism 
or the approval of others" (Alloy et a!., 2000). 
Based on the theories from Beck and Seligman, the cognitive vulnerability 
hypothesis purports that people respond differently to negative life events and that these 
maladaptive cognitive styles following negative events not only put people at risk for first 
onset of depression but also for the recurrence of depression (Alloy et a!., 2006). The 
results of the study done by Alloy et a!. (2006) indicate that negative cognitive styles, 
namely negative inferential styles and dysfunctional attitudes, increase the risk of onset 
of MDD seven-fold. Negative cognitive styles affect chronic MDD because they are 
resistant to change and thus increase the vulnerability for future major depressive 
episodes. 
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An additional risk factor for depression according to cognitive research is 
rumination. Rumination is essentially any behavior or thought that brings an individual's 
attention to depressive symptoms and the implication of these symptoms (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991). Rumination theorists believe that the tendency to focus on depressive 
symptoms maintain and exacerbate depression thus contributing to the chronic nature of 
depression. Through focusing on the symptoms one is bringing maladaptive cognitions to 
the forefront of their mind more often and consequently inhibits one from effectively 
dealing with the depressed mood. Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) found that the manner in 
which people respond to a depressed mood influences the duration of their depressed 
state. More specifically, individuals who ruminate in response to a depressed mood are 
more likely to maintain that mood and develop additional depressive episodes. The key 
processes underlying rumination that serve to maintain depression are negative thinking 
and poor problem-solving (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). 
The premise for rumination, as illustrated by Nolen-Hoeksema, is that it interferes 
with an individual's ability to be proactive in response to the onset of depression such 
that rapid recovery becomes difficult. Essentially, rumination interferes with effective 
thinking, instrumental behavior, and problem-solving ability (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). 
Enns and Cox (2005) replicated the association between rumination and chronic MDD. 
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They found a significant association between avoidance coping and remission. Nolen-
Hoeksema (1991) proposed the notion that avoidance coping was a good alternative to 
rumination and Enns and Cox (2005) provided reasons why it is beneficial. Avoidance 
coping presents the opportunity for positive social interaction, engagement in pleasurable 
activities, and alleviation of depressed mood (Enns and Cox, 2005). 
Ward et al. (2003) looked at how ruminative tendencies produce uncertainty in 
both the creation and implementation of solutions. Ruminators engage in repetitive 
thoughts regarding the meaning, causes, and consequences of mood with special attention 
to past failures and negative predictions about the future. Furthermore, it is well-
established that negative affect increases the accessibility of negative thoughts and 
memories (Ward et aI., 2003). Negative affect increases an individual's recall of negative 
memories, their negative self-evaluations, causes pessimistic inferences and attributions 
about an event, greater negative expectations about the future, and poor problem solving. 
Accordingly, Ward et al (2003) hypothesize that ruminators are will exhibit uncertainty 
about their judgment regarding a particular action (a decision) even after extensive 
reflection regarding its value. In turn, the uncertainty will sustain the rumination and 
subsequent inaction. Findings indicate that ruminators were (a) less satisfied, confident, 
and committed to plans, (b) reported greater periods of time to research solutions, and (c) 
exhibited a reduced willingness to commit to a solution. 
These cognitive theories provide evidence that [cognitive] response style to a 
depressed mood acts as a predictor for the onset and course of depression. Maladaptive 
thinking patterns such as hopelessness and rumination interfere with an individual's 
ability to be proactive and thus respond effectively to distress (that might arise when a 
decision needs to be made) in the presence of depression. As a result, maladaptive 
thinking not only elicits the onset of depression but also causes depressive symptoms to 
persist. 
1.3.3 Cognitive Processing Biases in Depression 
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Research addressing the cognitive processes of depressed individuals is important 
for understanding how one's information processing abilities/tendencies translate into the 
maladaptive thoughts and behavior patterns. It is well understood that depressed 
individuals excessively attend to negative emotions and exhibit negatively biased 
information processing styles. These tendencies cause the individual to disproportionately 
attend to and remember negative information (Siegle et a!., 2002; Gotlib et a!., 2005). 
Furthermore, these studies provide evidence that the way the decision process is 
approached, e.g. one's decision-making style, will have marked differences depending on 
the source of emotional input. 
Cognitive theories of depression purport that depressed individuals remember 
information that is relevant to and congruent with their negative schemas (Gotlib et a!., 
2004). Beck identifies these schemas of the depressed individual as adhering to themes of 
loss, rejection, disappointment, failures, etc (Johnson et a!., 2007). These schema themes 
are consistent with the types of biases in information processing that are consistently 
found in depressed individuals. The major processing biases occur with memory recall, 
inhibitory processes, and attention (e.g. attentional interference and selective attention) 
(Gotlib et a!., 2005; Johnson et a!., 2007; Gotlib et a!., 2004; Aikins & Craske, 2001). 
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Although the following evidence for cognitive biases are attained in laboratory settings it 
is thought that the cognitive biases manifest themselves across a range of tasks that assess 
perception, attention, and memory (e.g. decision-making tasks) (Joorman et aI., 2007; 
Gotlib et aI., 2004). 
Biases in the recall of information are very apparent in depressed individuals. 
Over general recall of negative autobiographical memories is common (Johnson et aI., 
2007). Furthermore, assessments of recall bias through incidental recall tasks indicate 
that depressed individuals recall more negative than positive stimuli. Preferential recall 
for negative information is also apparent and this preferential recall of negative 
information is especially true if the information is relevant to the individual (Johnson et 
aI., 2007; Gotlib et aI., 2004) These findings are important because our memory store 
includes memories for past choices, consequences of our actions/choices, outcomes and 
being that depressed individuals are prone to have preferential recall of negative aspects 
of these memories-- these are the memories likely to be drawn upon in making judgments 
about decision tasks. 
Attentional interferences are one source of cognitive bias found in depressed 
individuals. Attention for negative emotional information that is congruent with the 
individual's cognitive schema is commonly found among depressed individuals (same as 
in decision making literature, e.g. mood congruent decision making). Gotlib et a1. (2005) 
and Siegle et a1. (2002) provide evidence for these attentional biases. Gotlib et a1. (2005) 
found that after inducing a negative mood participants with a history of depression are 
biased toward processing negative information. Furthermore, these participants were 
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unable to disattend from the negative stimuli in the experimental task (Gotlib et aI., 
2005). Similarly, Siegle et a1. (2002) found that dysphonic participants quickly identified 
the emotional valence of negative words. However, these participants were slow to 
identify the emotional valence of positive words and the non-emotional aspects of the 
negative words. Gollib et a1. (2004) found inconsistent results for depressed participants 
on the Emotional Stroop task and attentional interference. Some findings indicate that 
higher scores on a depression measure are related to reaction time on the Stroop test and 
some don'\. However, Gotlib et a1. (2004) did find that depressed participants were 
biased toward negative words and faces on the word-face dot probe task looking at 
selective attention. Both of these studies demonstrate that depressed participants and 
participants with a history of depression exhibit selective attention to negative stimuli, 
which is consistent with theories of depression. 
Another cognitive bias attributed to depressed individuals deals with information 
recall. Alloy et a1. (1999) showed that individuals with negative cognitive styles are 
vulnerable to depression because they perceive and recall information about stressful 
events. Individuals that were rated as high risk toward developing either first onset or 
recurrent depression showed greater endorsement, faster processing, and better recall 
better adjectives that were depression-related (e.g. themes of incompetence, 
worthlessness, low motivation). Furthermore, this high risk group showed less 
endorsement, slower processing, and worse recall of positive depression-related 
adjectives (Alloy et aI., 1999). 
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This increased attention toward negative stimuli and differential processing of 
negative and positive stimuli in all of the preceding studies suggest that depressed 
individuals have deficits in their inhibitory processes (Gotlib et al., 2005). Additional 
evidence for this belief comes from a study where Gotlib et al. (2004) found that 
dysphonic individuals had difficulty inhibiting negative distracter stimuli but not positive 
distracter stimuli. Essentially, depressed individuals are at risk for cognitive biases 
whereby negative emotional information is processed more readily than positive or 
neutral information. This puts he individual at risk for attending selectively to certain 
types of stimuli and subsequently creating biases in the encoding, storing, and recall of 
information about a situation, event, or object. 
These findings are important in terms of a depressed individual's decision-making 
style because of the potential for biased use of information in making a decision. For 
instance, the depressed individual might attend to the negative aspects of all the 
alternatives and consequently avoid making a decision. Another possibility is that when 
the depressed individual encounters a situation similar to one of the past he or she might 
have a biased recall of information about the past outcome. In other words, regardless of 
the actual outcome in the past a depressed person will recall negative aspects and in turn 
make a decision based on the biased recall of information rather than on an impartial scan 
of information from a past event (as suggested by normative decision theories). 
The bottom line is that although an emotion such as fear or anxiety might arise in 
response to a decision task; the evaluation of information as it peliains to the decision 
task may be largely dependent on the pre-existing emotional state of the decision-maker. 
34 
In other words, depending on whether the individual is depressed or not depressed will 
determine the type of cognitive processing that occurs about the information in a given 
decision situation which will in turn determine the type of decision the individual makes-
- e.g. avoidant, dependent, spontaneous. 
These assumptions about the relationship between cognitive style (biased in 
depressed individuals; unbiased in non-depressed individuals) and decision-making style 
are consistent with the misattribution of incidental affective states Pham (2007) 
addresses. The tendency is for people to attribute their affective states to whatever object 
is the current focus of their attention (Pham 2007). Furthermore these cognitive studies 
with depressed individuals point to an affective interference hypothesis (Siegle et aI., 
2002) NOT to an affect as information hypothesis as is generally referenced in decision-
making literature. 
This discrepancy in the role emotion plays in cognitive processes and subsequent 
behavioral responses is not to say one theory is right and the other is wrong. Rather, this 
discrepancy demonstrates that the affective influence on cognitive and behavioral 
responses will depend on the degree (normal range of affect versus pathological affect) 
and source (pre-existing; decision-induced) of the affect. In this way emotions are not 
simply a "by-product" of a decision but an interactive influence that determines as much 
of what the decision-maker does as situation factors (e.g. contextual effects) will 
determine. 
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1.3.4 Cognitive Theories of Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
Many of the cognitivc prcmises of depression also apply to the construct of 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). Some of the cognitive characteristics of GAD that 
are similar to depression include maladaptive cognitive processing, rumination/worry, 
and negatively biased perceptions about the future and the world (Roemer & Orsillo, 
2002; Aikins & Craske, 2001; Borkovec, 1994). GAD is a chronic, pervasive, and 
uncontrollable illness in which excessive, pervasive worry is the prominent characteristic 
(Roemer & Orsillo, 2002). Furthermore, the worry is not specifIc to one identifiable 
problem but to a wide range of problems. The pervasive nature of the worry ultimately 
causes physical symptoms, psychosocial impairments, and significant interference with 
normal functioning (Aikins & Craske, 2001; Roemer & Orsillo, 2002). Thus, research has 
focused on the cognitive origins of worry and how these cognitive impairments translate 
into maladaptive behavior. 
Cognitive theorists assert that maladaptive cognitive processes are a major source 
of excessive worry. These maladaptive cognitions in turn yield problems such as 
intolerance for uncertainty, increased sensitivity to risk, and cognitive avoidance (Aikins 
& Craske, 200 I; Roemer & Orsillo, 2002). The primary cognitive bias characteristic of 
GAD is a view of the world as a dangerous place in which future events will have 
negative and catastrophic outcomes (Borkovec, 1994; Aikins and Craske, 2001). This 
interpretation of the world and the future is the product of attentional biases, threat-
related interpretations of stimuli, and memory biases (Aikins and Craske, 200 I; Roemer 
& Orsillo, 2002). 
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Research suggests that the following cognitive biases are a function of the worry 
characteristic of GAD. Attentional biases in GAD reflect an automatic tendency to attend 
selectively to negative and threat-related stimuli (Aikins & Craske, 2001; Gotlib et aI., 
2005). Similarly, when an individual with GAD is confronted with a situation defined by 
ambiguity or uncertainties the tendency is to catastrophize any potential outcome of the 
situation. Finally, memory-congruent biases similar to those found in depressed 
individuals are characteristic of GAD. In other words, individuals with GAD who 
perceive the world as threatening are apt to develop threat schemas, which are 
subsequently the source of information that is accessed during a state of worry (Aikins & 
Craske, 2001). 
Theories regarding the function of the worry in GAD are important to consider in 
terms of decision-making style. Borkovec (1994) asserts that worry has two potential 
functions: (1) people believe that worry will reduce the likelihood of low-probability 
negative events in the future or (2) worry is used to avoid the negative feelings associated 
with intel11al distress. However, in reality worrying neither decreases the chance of 
negative events nor does it decrease actual internal distress. The worrier however makes 
the incorrect assumption that the non-occurrence of negative events is the result of worry. 
Worrying is thus reinforced by attributing the non-occurrence of negative events to 
worrying rather than the avoidance of a problem (Roemer & Orsillo, 2002; Borkovec, 
1994; Aikins & Craske, 2001). In the long-term chronic worry can inhibit emotional 
processing and thus maintain the cognitions that produce the anxiety (Borkovec, 1994; 
Roemer & Orsillo, 2002). 
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Behaviorally, worry serves as an avoidance strategy that enables the individual to 
avoid dealing with internal distress, which in turn produces unsuccessful problem-solving 
through procrastination (Roemer & Orsillo, 2002). Similarly, Metzger et aI. (1990) 
showed that worry slows down decision-making speed through behavioral inaction. 
Essentially, in the presence of a problem a person with GAD chooses the "flight" and 
rarely the "fight" response. The individual avoids taking any action that is related to the 
feared problem-- both in the desired and the fear direction (Metzger et aI., 1990). This 
absence of action in any direction toward the threatening problem is thought to further the 
occurrence of rumination and worry (Aikins & Craske, 2001). 
1.3.5 Cognitive Biases in Negative Affect and tlte Relationship to Decision-Making 
Style 
Theories such as the affect-as-information hypothesis and the affect regulation 
model look at the role of affect in decision-making. The underlying theme of these 
theories is that aiTective responses interact with cognitive evaluations of decision 
alternatives, which together inform and drive a decision-makers behavior. These theories 
are built on studies that evaluate the influence of a normal range of affect (e.g. sad, 
happy, fearful, angry) on decision-making behavior and pay little attention to the 
influence of affective states that lay on the extreme ends of the affective continuum. 
Thus we looked at the cognitive and clinical psychology literature to gain insight 
into how extreme negative affective states (e.g. depression and generalized anxiety) 
influence cognitive processes and subsequent behavior. We found that pathological 
affective states bias normal cognitive processing of information. Therefore, theories 
regarding how affect influences cognitive appraisals and inform behavior are very 
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different in the cognitive/clinicalliterature than in the decision-making literature. 
Essentially, pathological degrees of negative affect interfere with rational processes and 
thus inform behavior very differently. It is important to address these discrepancies by 
conducting an exploratory analysis of the relationship between decision-making style and 
(pathological) negative affect. 
The consequence of inducing a negative mood in a depressed or anxious 
individual will be different than the consequence of inducing a negative mood in a non-
depressed, non-anxious individual. Why? Cognitive biases in information processing 
facilitate the activation of attention to and recall of negatively valcnced information. This 
is important to consider in terms of decision-making because inducing a negative mood 
in a depressed decision-maker is likely to lead the decision-maker to disproportionately 
attend to negative characteristics of the decision or activate biased recall of negative past 
outcomes or consequences ofa decision. The potential of the preceding cognitive events 
occurring in response to an affective state when making a decision contradicts decision 
literature in the following ways: 
1) Negative (pathological) affect and subsequent cognitive processing biases 
interferes with the objective, rational, and impartial decision-making abilities proposed in 
normati ve theories 
2) Negative (pathological) affect and subsequent cognitive processing biases are 
more substantial than the processing biases that result from a normal range of negative 
affect (e.g. fear, doubt, regret). Therefore, a pathological negative afTective state causes 
attention to and recall of negative stimuli and information that is stronger, less inhibited, 
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and more debilitating than attention to and recall of negative stimuli in normal negative 
affective states. Thus suggesting that affect no longer serves as ini()l'l11ation for making a 
decision but rather interferes with the ability to make optimal decisions based on criterion 
attended to by non-depressed, non-anxious individuals. 
When the source of affective input is outside the normal range of emotion the 
effect on cognitive processes and behavior becomes different. In terms of decision-
making, affect no longer informs decisions in a productive, helpful, biologically-driven 
manner. Rather, affect outside the normal range informs decisions in a negatively biased, 
mood-congruent, irrational way. The pathological affective state brought to the decision 
situation has the potential to influence emotions related to the decision situation. 
1.4 Theoretical Justification 
The preceding literature review provides the theoretical fi'amcwork for the current 
study. A great deal is understood about the cognitive underpinnings of each construct 
identified for this study-- depression, generalized anxiety, and decision-making. It is 
important to continuously extend our knowledge of how these cognitive processes 
translate into behavior. For the purposes of the present study the focus is on decision-
making behavior and the manner in which negative affect influences decision-making 
behavior through its effect on cognitive processing. The preceding review of the 
relationship between cognitive processes (e.g. encoding, recall, attention, information 
processing) and affective influences on these processes (e.g. mood congruent processing) 
drives our hypotheses. 
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Following a review of the literature it is clear that although researeh regarding the 
relationship between decision-making and emotions/cognitions exists, the majority of the 
work within the decision-making literature has focused on the relationship between 
transitory affective states, cognitive processes, and decision-making behavior. Thus, it is 
important to conduct more research on how pathological affective states influence 
decision-making behavior. The hypotheses regarding the relationship between negative 
affect and decision-making style set forth in the following section are based on the 
differential effect of pathological and non-pathological affect on cognitive processes. 
1.5 Research Question 
The theoretical background of each construct and a subsequent integration of 
theory provide a fi'amework with which we have formulated the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis I: There will be decision-making styles that are specific to depressive 
symptoms and others that arc specific to anxiety symptoms. Additionally, each affective 
state will be correlated with mUltiple decision-making styles but a primary style will 
emerge. 
I) Rational decision making style will be negatively correlated with depression and 
anxiety 
2) Avoidant decision making style will be positively correlated with depression and 
anxiety 
3) Intuitive decision making style will be positively correlated with anxiety 
4) Dependent decision making style will be positively correlated with depression 
5) Spontaneous decision making style will be positively correlated with anxiety and 
negatively correlated with depression 
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1. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
2.1 Participants 
A total of 78 participants were recruited from undergraduate psychology courses 
at Drexel University recruited. Permission from professors to recruit from courses was 
received through Sona Systems. Participation was contingent on the following inclusion 
and exclusion criteria for participation. 
2.2 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
Participants were required to be full time Drexel University students between the 
ages of 18 and 29. No participant was excluded ii'om the study on the basis of gender, 
ethnicity, religion, or year in school (e.g. freshman through senior). Participants were 
excluded from final analyses if they developed emotional distress when filling out the 
questionnaires and were subsequently unable to complete the study (for procedures if this 
does occur see section labeled "Recruitment"). Furthermore, pmticipants were excluded 
if they exhibit any mental disabilities during the informed consent procedure. 
2.3 Materials 
The participants were asked to complete an informed consent document, a 
demographic form, and a series of three measures. The measures administered included: 
(I) The General Decision Making Style (GDMS) Inventory (accompanied by a vignette), 
(2) the Beck Depression Inventory Second Edition (BDI-II), and (3) the Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire-IV (GADQ-IV). The GDMS was administered to assess 
participant's behavioral decision-making style; the BDI-II and the GADQ-IV were used 
to assess negati ve affect. 
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Counterbalancing was accomplished by administering the measures in the 
following order: (1) GDMS; (2) GADQ-IV; (3) BDI-II. The reasoning behind placing the 
GDMS first was to avoid having emotions influence GDMS responses that could arise 
from filling out the GADQ-IV and BDI-II. 
2.3.11nformed Consent 
(See Appendix A) 
2.3.2 Demographic Form 
(See Appendix B) 
The demographic form was developed by the first researcher for the current study 
and was administered to all participants. The form asked for general demographic 
information regarding the participant's age, gender, ethnicity, year in college and major. 
The form also asked the participant to indicate if he or she has ever received 
professional treatment for depression or anxiety. This information was used solely as a 
reference during statistical analyses to understand potential differences between 
individuals currently experiencing negative affective symptoms and those with a history 
of symptoms and/or current symptoms. 
2.3.3 Affect Measures 
The BDI-II is a 21-item self report measure, which indicates the current severity 
of depressive symptoms. The GADQ-IV is a 9-item self-report measure that assesses 
excessive worry commonly associated with GAD (Nezu, A.M., 2000). Both measures 
have solid psychometric properties. 
44 
2.3.3.1 Beck Depression Inventory Second Addition (BD1-II) 
The Beck Depression Inventory Second Edition (BDl-II) is a 21-item self-repOlt 
instrument designed to assess the existence and severity of depression symptoms. Each 
item, which is on a four-point Likert-type scale corresponds to a symptom of depression. 
Higher scores indicate more depressive symptoms. The respondent is asked to consider 
each statement within the context of how they have felt for the past two weeks, which is 
in accordance with the DSM-IV criterion for receiving a diagnosis of depression (Nezu, 
A.M., 2000). 
The BDI-II has sound psychometric properties. The BDl-II has been found to be 
reliable, with good internal consistency (.92 and .93, for an outpatient and college student 
sample, respectively) as well as good test-retest reliability (.93 in an outpatient sample). 
Construct validity, which indicated that the BDl-II differentiates between depressed from 
non-depressed patients, has been found to be .93 when compared to the BDI-IA and .68 
when correlated with the Beck Hopelessness Scale (Nezu, A.M., 2000). 
2.3.3.2 Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire-IV (GADQ-IV) 
The GADQ-IV is a 9-item, Likert-type self-report measure used to assess the 
presence, duration, excessiveness, and uncontrollability of worry. The GADQ-IV also 
assesses symptoms associated with worry and the degree to which they interfere with and 
cause distress in the person's life (Antony, M.M., 2001). In a college sample the GADQ-
IV has shown good internal consistency and good two week test-retest reliability (.81) 
(Antony, M.M., 2001). Good validity has been established for the GADQ-IV as well. 
Validity has been established by strong correlations with the Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire, a measure of trait anxiety, and clinician administered Anxiety Disorder 
Interview Schedule diagnoses (Antony, M.M., 2001). Sensitivity (69%) and specificity 
(97%) have also been solid for the GADQ-IV (Antony, M.M., 2001). 
2.3.3.3 General Decision Making Style InventOlY (GDMS) plus Vignette 
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The GDMS is a 25-question self-report measure that assesses decision making 
style. The five styles included on the measure are rational, intuitive, dependent, 
spontaneous, and avoidant. The GDMS has good validity and reliability ratings. Content 
and face validity range from .68 to .95, internal reliability ranges ii'om .67 to .87, and 
test-retest reliability ranges from .58 to .67 (Spicer & Sadler-Smith, 2005). Scott and 
Bruce (1995) have validated each of the five scales on the GDMS. Internal reliability for 
the rational scale is reported to be between .77 and .85, the intuitive scale, .78-.84, the 
avoidant scale, .93-.94, the dependent scale, .68- .86, and the spontaneous scale, .87. 
Spicer & Sadler-Smith's (2005) research suggests that (l) higher rational scores 
are related to lower scores on the intuitive, avoidant and spontaneous scales; and (2) 
intuitive, spontaneous, and avoidant scales are positively related. Furthermore, Scott and 
Bruce (2005) found significant correlations among some scale scores, which implies that 
decision making styles are not completely independent of one another. The significant 
correlations identified were (1) scores on the rational scale are negatively correlated with 
scores on the avoidant and spontaneous scales and (2) scores on the intuitive scale 
positively correlated with scores on the spontaneous scale (Scott and Bruce, 1995). But 
despite these correlations between different scales on the GDMS Scott and Bruce (2005) 
have found that a primary decision making style does emerge among decision makers. 
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The participant were asked to fill out the GDMS after reading a vignette that 
depicted a general decision scenario regarding making a decision about something 
important (Appendix J). Initially we thought to have participants fill out the questionnaire 
twice, each time with a different scenario; however, we determined that since our 
prediction about decision-making style reflects a more global, consistent type of decision 
behavior that this would not be unnecessary. 
2.4 Procedure 
Participants were recruited from entry-level psychology courses at Drexel 
University following permission from a) the undergraduate director of psychology 
(Jacqueline Kloss) and b) the course instructor. The first researcher made an 
announcement about the study in the classroom and ask interested students to sign-up by 
either emailing the first researcher (email: afs36(il)drcxel.cdu) or by signing up on Sona 
Systems. Additionally, the first researcher sent out an email to the class roster 
periodically throughout the term to remind students of the opportunity to participate in 
the study. 
Once the student agreed to participate in the study a private room at Hagerty 
Library on Drexel University's University City Campus (address: 33rd Street and Market 
Street, Philadelphia, P A 19104) was reserved for the scheduled time. When multiple 
participants were scheduled simultaneously cubicles in Hagerty Library were utilized to 
minimize discomfort produced by proximity to others that could result in less truthful 
answers. Furthermore, an attempt was made to schedule participants at approximately the 
same time of day to minimize the influence of the time of day on responses since 
negative affect is known to fluctuate as a function of the time of day. 
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Upon arrival to the scheduled meeting place the participant was given a brief 
introduction to the study. Then the details of the consent form (e.g. confidentiality, 
voluntary participation, and risks involved in completing the questionnaires) were 
explained to each participant. If the participant agreed to participate he or she was asked 
to sign the consent form. Once the participant signed the consent form the first researcher 
placed the signed form in an envelope and administered the three questionnaires (GDMS, 
GADQ-IV, BDI-II). Following completion of the questionnaires the participant placed 
the numbered questionnaires in a separate folder from the consent form and was given a 
debriefing form. The debriefing form provided more details about the study (a possible 
method for controlling for any distress caused by not knowing the purpose of their 
answers) and contact information for the research team should they have questions at a 
later time. 
2.5 Recruitment 
Participants were recruited from introductory psychology courses at Drexel 
University (Address: 3141 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA, 19104). PriOl·to 
recruitment, permission from Dr. Jacqueline Kloss, director of the undergraduate 
department of psychology was obtained. Furthermore, all interaction with participants 
was professional and in accordance with both the American Psychological Association 
(APA) and Health Information Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA) 
guidelines and standards. 
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The first researcher recruited participants from introductory psychology courses 
following an introduction by the professor at his or her discretion. A brief description of 
the study was given to the class. In addition, students were informed that extra credit 
toward that class would given in exchange for participation. Interested students were 
asked to provide the first researcher with their name and email address with which to be 
contacted to schedule a time for participation. In order to provide students with additional 
chances to participate in the study an announcement was also emailed to the students 
listed on the psychology course roster periodically throughout the term. Students were 
given the opportunity to (I) sign-up up by emailing the first researcher (Annemarie 
Schoemaker at aC<;36(iil~:!r~l'el.edu), or (2) to sign-up on Sona Systems. 
The investigator was certain to inform all participants that their participation is 
voluntary and that they are free to discontinue pmticipation at any point. FUlthermore, 
participants were informed that any information they provide would remain confidential. 
A brief introduction to the study was given and the investigator verbally screened each 
participant to ensure that they meet the inclusion and exclusion criteria for participation. 
Next, the consent form was administered to each participant and any questions about the 
form answered. The participants were asked to sign the consent form if they agree to all 
the conditions stated and the signed form was then be placed in a sealable envelope. 
Following completion of the consent form the demographic form and the 
measures were administered. Each set of measures were assigned a number that 
corresponds to the number on the consent form and the demographic form in order to 
maintain confidentiality. Following completion of the package the pmticipants were 
instructed to personally place the completed measures in one sealable envelope and the 
demographic form in a separate sealable envelope. 
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At this point a debriefing form was given to the participant that further explained 
the purpose of the study. The debriefing form also had both investigators contact 
information should the participant develop any concerns or questions following 
participation. Finally, the debriefing form had the contact information of the student 
counseling center at Drexel University should the participant develop any emotional 
distress after completion of the study or at any point in the future. 
2.6 Ethical Considerations 
The main ethical considerations that were addressed include confidentiality and 
the potential for emotional distress. It was the responsibility of the investigator to ensure 
that the participant's confidentiality was maintained through the following procedures. 
Any paperwork that identified the participant by name (e.g. the consent form) was stored 
separately from the answers the participant provides on the demographic form and the 
measures. In addition, all paperwork was stored in a designated locked filing cabinet in 
the Psychology Department of Drexel University (Address: 245 N. 15th Street, 3'd Floor, 
Philadelphia, P A 19102). 
Furthermore, participants were informed that the investigator is bound to 
confidentiality by the consent form. Accordingly, all information provided on the 
demographic form and the responses on the questionnaires was reviewed solely by the 
investigators listed on the consent form (Arthur Nezu and Annemarie Schoemaker). Also, 
the participant was informed that their information will be reviewed in a professional 
manner and will be used for research purposes only. 
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The issue of the potential for emotional distress as a result of completing 
measures that touch on some personal and sensitive matters needed to be addressed. If a 
participant became emotionally distressed during the study he or she was advised to 
discontinue participation. Furthermore, if the investigator determined that the emotional 
distress was severe she would accompany the participant to the Counseling Center at 
Drexel University or to an emergency room. As abovementioned, a debriefing form with 
both the investigator's information and the counseling center's information was provided 
should the participant determine at a later time that he or she has questions or concerns. 
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2. RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS 
3.1 Research Design 
A correlation design was employed in the present study because the purpose was 
exploratory in nature. The goal being to determine whether decision-making style and 
negative affect are associated. Self-reported levels of depression, generalized anxiety, and 
decision-making style were recorded. Bivariate correlations were run to assess the 
relationship between the five subscales oflhe GDMS, depressive symptoms, and 
generalized anxiety symptoms. The goal was to determine if scores on the BDI-II and the 
GADQ-IV are significantly correlated with the predicted subscales of the decision 
making style inventory. 
3.2 Statistical Analysis 
3.2.1 Preliminary Analysis 
1) First, the distribution of scores on the measures will bc examined. 1 will investigate 
potential reasons non-normal distributions of variables and outliers should they appear. 
2) Generate a correlation matrix. 
3) Examine bivariate correlations between affect measures (BDI-II, GADQ) and the 
subscales of the decision-making style measure (GDMS). 
4) Examine partial correlations to determine specificity of negative affect and decision 
making sty Ie. 
3.2.2 Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis 1: There will be decision making styles that are specific to depression and 
others that are specific to anxiety. 
- look at pattern of bivariate correlations between scores on affect measures and 
subscales of decision making measures 
- look at partial correlations between each negative affectmcasure and decision 
making style subscales 
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3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides demographic characteristics (age, gender, ethnicity) of the 76 
participants for the current study. This information was obtained via sejj~report. All 
statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS 16.0. Participant's ages ranged ii'om 18 to 
29 (M=20, SD = 2.04). Forty-seven percent of the participants were male and fifty-three 
percent were female. Class rank was fairly evenly distributed (23.7% Freshman, 32.9% 
Sophomores, 25.0% Juniors, 18.4% Seniors). The ethnicities represented include: 
Caucasian (54%), Black (4%), Asian (27.6%), Hispanic (5.3%), European American 
(2.6%), and Other (6.6%). 
Table 1. Sample Descriptive Statistics 
N Mean SD 
Age 20 2.04 
Gender 
Male 36 
Female 40 
Total 76 
Ethnicity 
Caucasian 41 
Black 3 
Hispanic 4 
Asian 21 
Other 7 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the BDI-I1, the GADQ, and the GDMS. 
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The higher the score on both the BDI-II and the GADQ-IV indicates a higher number of 
depressive or generalized anxiety symptoms, respectively. The GDMS includes five 
subscales- avoidant, spontaneous, intuitive, rational and dependent. The mean score for 
each of the five decision-making styles is also indicated in Table 2. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: Study Measures 
N Range Mean SD 
GDMS-A 76 5-24 13.39 5.04 
GDMS-S 76 7-24 14.13 3.92 
GDMS-I 76 12-23 18.47 2.41 
GDMS-R 76 13-25 20.09 2.97 
GDMS-D 76 10-24 18.01 3.64 
BDI-II 76 0-25 8.78 5.75 
GADQ 76 0-28 9.57 7.84 
3.3.2 Preliminmy Analyses 
The five decision-making style variables and two negative affect variables were 
analyzed to determine whether the distribution of scores was normal. After conducting 
descriptive analyses it was determined that the distribution of scores for each variable 
was normal, indicating that Pearson's R could be used to test the studies hypothesis. 
A total of seven I-tests were conducted to explore whether there were between group 
gender differences for either the decision-making style variables or the affect variables. 
To control for Type I error, a p value of .01 was used for these preliminary analyses. 
Results of the i-tests revealed a lack of significant group differences, with the exception 
of gender differences on one of the decision-making style variables, the dependent style. 
The difference between male and females on dependent decision making style, 1(71) = -
2.86,p < .01 indicating that female pmticipants scored significantly higher on the scale 
that measured dependent decision-making style, as compared with their male 
counterparts. No other between group differences were identified for gender on the 
decision-making style or affect variables. 
3.3.3 Correlation and Partial Correlation Analyses 
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The correlation analyses addressed the major hypothesis regarding the predicted 
relationships between decision-making style and depressive and anxious symptoms. 
Given the high correlation between the BDI-II and the GADQ (r = .487,p < .001) it is 
important to examine the uniqueness of negative affectivity variables in their contribution 
to decision-making style. Therefore, partial correlations were conducted to assess the 
independent relationship of each affective variable to decision-making style. 
The correlations and partial correlations for the five decision-making style scales, 
the BDI-II, and the GADQ-IV are presented in Table 3. The correlation analyses revealed 
that depressive symptoms are significantly related to avoidant decision-making style (r = 
0.32, p < .001) and to rational decision-making style (r = -0.26, p < .05) in the predicted 
direction. However, the other predicted relationships were not supported as there were no 
significant relationships between depressive and anxious symptoms and the remaining 
three GDMS scales- intuitive, spontaneous, and dependent. As shown in Table 3, no 
significant correlations were found between anxious symptoms and any scale on the 
GDMS. 
The next analysis (pmtial correlations) addressed the hypothesis positing that 
there would be decision-making styles that are specific to depression and others that are 
specific to anxiety. This hypothesis was only pattially suppOlted. The only relationship 
that remained significant was between depressive symptoms and the rational scale (r = 
.36,p < .001) after controlling for anxious symptoms. However, it is worth noting that 
although the relationship between depressive symptoms and rational decision-making 
style did not remain significant after controlling for anxious symptoms, the relationship 
was found to be nearing significance (r = .20, p = .08). 
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Table 3, Correlations and Partial Corl'elations for Decision-Making Style and 
Depressive and Anxious Symptoms 
GDMS-A GDMS-S GDMS-I GDMS-R GDMS-D BDI-II 
GADQ 
Corr 
Partial Corr Partial 
GDMS-A -0.36* 0.35* 0.36** 
0.32* 0.17 -0.00 
GDMS-S 0.28* -0.57** 0.15 
0.08 0.18 0.12 
GDMS-I 0.28* -0.10 
-0.09 -0.05 -0.00 
GDMS-D 0.35* 0.14 
1.00 -0.19 0.13 
GDMS-R -0.36* -0.57** -0.26**' 
0.20 -0.18 -0.06 
56 
GDMS-A = General Decision Making Style Inventory- Avoidant Scale; GDMS-S = 
General Decision Making Style Inventory- Spontaneous Scale; General Decision Making 
Style Inventory- Intuitive Scale; General Decision Making Style Inventory- Rational 
Scale; General Decision Making Style Inventory- Dependent Scale; BDI-II - Beck 
Depression Inventory, Second Edition; GADQ = Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
Questionnaire. 
*p < .01 
**p < .001 
*** P < .05 
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3. DISCUSSION 
The present investigation sought to determine whether any relationships exist 
between an individual's general decision-making style and negative affect. The study 
focused on one's global decision-making style, or one's tendency to approach decisions 
across situations in a similar manner. Additionally, we looked at whether there was an 
association between this global tendency to make decisions in a particular manner and the 
presence of a pathological affective state (e.g. symptoms of depression and anxiety). Past 
research has focused mainly on the way in which affect within the normal range (e.g. sad, 
happy, and fearful) influences decision-making (Lewinsohn & Mano, 1993; Loewenstein 
et aI., 2001; Metzger et aI., 1990; Pham, 2007; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Winkielman 
et aI., 2007). Thus the goal of the present study was to determine ifany patterns exist in 
the way one makes decisions when pathological levels of affect are present. 
We hypothesized that the five decision-making styles (rational, avoidant, 
intuitive, dependent, spontaneous) measured hy the GDMS would yield independent 
associations with symptoms of depression and anxiety. Research within the cognitive 
psychology literature regarding how depression and anxiety influence cognitive 
processing and subsequent behavior infol1ned the predicted relationships between affect 
and decision- making (Abramson et aI., 2005; Aikins & Craske, 200 I; Alloy et aI., 2000, 
Borkovec, 1994; Gotlib et aI., 2004, 2005). The only hypothesized relationships 
supported were for the relationship between symptoms of depression and both rational 
and avoidant decision-making styles. 
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Depressive symptoms were found to be negatively correlated with rational 
decision-making style and positively correlated with avoidant decision-making style. In 
other words, the higher one scored on the BDI-II, or the more depressive symptoms one 
endorsed, the lower they scored on the rational subscale of the decision-making style 
inventory, or the less rational they tend to be when making a decision. This finding is 
consistent with the cognitive literature, which provides evidence for biases in information 
processing when symptoms of depression are present. For instance, Siegle et ai. (2002) 
and Gotlib et ai. (2005) have provided substantial evidence that depressed individuals 
exhibit tendencies to disproportionately attend to and remember negative information. 
Thus lending support to the notion that when an individual is faced with a decision, that 
the depressive symptoms could prime negative mood congruent memory recall, which in 
turn would preclude the occurrence of a rational decision process (Gotlib et ai., 2004). 
This in turn would lend itself to a decision based on one's negative self-concept, 
disproportionate attention to negative cues in the environment, 01' biased recall of 
[negative 1 information, which the literature supports as common biases found amongst 
depressed individuals (Aikins & Craske, 2001; Gotlib et ai., 2004; Gotlib et ai., 2004; 
Gotlib et ai., 2005; '!ohnson et ai., 2007). In other words, an individual with depressive 
symptoms might frame a decision, gather information, and make a choice based on 
information that is congruent with their depressed affect rather than on a rational 
assessment of the available information. 
The second finding of the present investigation suggests that individuals with 
more symptoms of depression exhibit more avoidant tendencies when making decisions. 
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This is not surprising given the literature on the hopeless and ruminative characteristics 
of depression (Roemer & Orsillo, 2002; Aikins and Craske, 2001; Borkovec, 1994). 
These cognitive patterns interfere with an individual's ability to be proactive and thus 
respond effectively in an attempt to make a decision. The findings that symptoms of 
depression translate into irrational and avoidant decision-making styles provides evidence 
in favor of a model of decision-making whereby affect does not serve as information but 
rather as a source of inference. The controversy regarding whether affect helps or inhibits 
decision behavior may go beyond the decision context as well as the valence of the affect 
present at the time of the decision. 
The preceding findings suggest that it is possible that the source of affective input, 
normal or pathological, plays a role in whether or not affect is useful in decision making. 
The findings provide evidence that affect no longer informs decisions in a productive, 
biologically-driven manner once they cross a certain threshold. Rather, affect outside of 
the normal range (e.g. happy, sad, and angry) informs decisions in a negatively biased, 
mood-congruent, irrational way. 
No relationships were found between depressive symptoms and the intuitive, 
dependent, or spontaneous decision-making styles. This is not surprising for the 
spontaneous and intuitive styles of decision-making because features characteristic of 
spontaneity and intuition-guided behavior are not consistent with typical features of 
depression. The potential to act based on intuition or spontaneously is essentially counter-
intuitive to what we know about depression. Depressed individuals' tend to exhibit 
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ruminative and avoidant tendencies, which ultimately negate the presence of intuitive or 
spontaneous actions (Borkovec, 1994; Roemer & Orsillo, 2002). 
The lack of association between symptoms of depression and a dependent 
decision-making style is somewhat surprising due to the tendency for depressed 
individuals to exhibit self-schemas consistent with dependency. For instance, Alloy et al. 
(2002) have shown that depressed individuals often determine their seli:worth on the 
basis of approval by others, which would lead one to believe that we would see 
correlations between dependent decision-making style and depression. However, the 
alternative would be that some depressed individuals isolate themselves and would thus 
not show a dependent decision-making style. Further investigation is necessary to 
understand the detailed nature of these relationships. 
It is also noteworthy that the only group differences found were on the dependent 
decision-making style subscale. Female participants scored significantly higher on this 
subscale than males, which might suggest a gender difference in terms of that particular 
decision-making style. It is possible that females tend to exhibit more dependent 
decision-making styles irrespective of their symptoms of anxiety or depression. 
There were also no relationships found between anxiety symptoms and any of the 
five decision-making style subscales. Furthermore, the partial correlation analyses 
revealed that only the relationship between depressive symptoms and rational-decision 
making style remains significant once anxiety symptoms were controlled. This finding 
was surprising given the cognitive literature, which suggests that the three key 
components of anxiety are intolerance for uncertainty, cognitive avoidance, and threat-
related cognitions about the future, all of which translate into avoidant behavior (Aikins 
& Craske, 2001; Borkovec, 1994; Roemer & Orsillo, 2002). 
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Further investigations are needed to tease apart the relationship between the 
symptoms of depression and anxiety and decision-making style. The present findings 
provide initial evidence that an individual's affective state influences decision behavior. 
However, given the study design it was not possible to determine the exact mechanism by 
which affect exerts its influence on decision behavior. It was presumed that cognitive 
style played a mediating role; however, it is impossible to make this assertion based on 
this investigation. Future research needs to look more directly at the mechanism of action 
to determine whether cognitive styles tied to pathological affective states can account for 
the variation in decision-making style. 
Several limitations must also be noted. Both the small, homogeneous sample size 
and the correlational design inhibit our ability to draw meaningful conclusions that go 
beyond speculation about the proposed relationships. The correlational design was 
employed given the exploratory nature of the study, which sought to determine whether a 
relationship between decision-making and affect does in fact exist. However, future 
studies should employ a more complex form of statistical analysis. For instance, a 
mUltiple regression analysis might be used to better understand whether negative affect 
predicts decision-making style as well as the interaction amongst the variables. Future 
investigations on this topic should seek to increase the sample size and implement a more 
complex study design to gain more insight into the relationship between decision-making 
and negative affect. 
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Additionally, the measures used to assess depressive and anxious symptoms limit 
our ability to draw strong inferences regarding "pathological" affective states since these 
are state measures of depression and anxiety. The study sought to understand how the 
affective states of depression and anxiety are associated with decision-making style. 
However, the measures used are measures of symptoms of these affective states. Thus, it 
would be advisable for future research to measure affect in a way that can provide 
information regarding the pervasiveness as well as the trait versus state nature of 
depression and generalized anxiety. 
Furthermore, future studies might consider adding a measure of cognitive style in 
addition to an affective measure in order to better understand the proposed mechanism of 
action. In other words, the present study proposes that the relationship between negative 
affect and decision-making is the result of the cognitive state associated with the various 
affective states. Thus, determining whether cognitive style does in fact moderate or 
mediate this relationship would become important in understanding the relationship 
between affect and decision-making. Finally, future studies may also consider additional 
methods for measuring general decision-making style. For instance, future investigations 
might use a more interactive measure of general decision-making style (e.g. the use of 
vignettes) or measure the various components of decision-making (e.g. framing versus 
coming up with alternatives. 
63 
5. LIST OF REFERENCES 
Abramson, L. Y., Alloy, L.B., Hankin, B.L., Haeffel, GJ., MacCoon, D.G., and Gibb, 
B.E. (2005). Cognitive Vulnerability-Stress Models of Depression in a Self-
Regulatory and Psychobiological Context. In Ian H. Gotlib & Constance L. 
Hammen Handbook of Depression (Eds.), (268-294). New York: The Guilford 
Press. 
Aikins, D.E., and Craske, M.G. (2001). Cognitive theories of generalized anxiety 
disorder. The P.lychiatric Clinical of North America, 24(1), 57-71. 
Alloy, L.B., Abramson, L.Y., I-logan, E., Whitehouse, W.G., Rose, D.T., Robinson, M.S., 
Kim, R.S., and Lapkin, .T.B. (2000). The temple-wisconsin cognitive vulnerability 
To depression project: Lifetime history of Axis I psychopathology in individuals 
At high and low cognitive risk for depression. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 
109(3),403-418. 
Alloy, L.B., Abramson, L.Y., Whitehouse, W.G., Hogan, M.E., Panzarella, C., and Rose, 
D.T. (2006). Prospective incidence of first onsets and recurrences of depression in 
Individuals at high and low cognitive risk for depression. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 115(1): 145-156. 
Anderson, C.J. (2003). The psychology of doing nothing: Forms of decision avoidance 
result from reason and emotion. hychological Bulletin, 129(1),139-167. 
Antony, Martin M. (Editor). Practitioner '.I' Guide to Empirically-Based Measures of 
Anxiety. Hingham, MA, USA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001. p 200. 
Beck, A.T., Steer, R.A. and Gm'bin, M.G. (1988). Psychometric properties of the beck 
depression inventory: Twenty-five years of evaluation. Clinical Psychology 
Review. 8,77-100. 
Borkovec, T. D. The nature, functions, and origins of worry. In Davey, G.C.L., and 
Tallis, F. (1994). Worrying: Perspectives on theory, assessment and treatment. Oxford, 
England: John Wiley & Sons. 
Damasio, A.R. (1994). Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain. 
New York: I-Iarper Perennial. 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o(,Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision. 
Washington, DC, American Psychological Association, 2000. 
Edwards, W., and Fasolo, B. (2001). Decision technology. Annuml Review of 
Psycholo&'Y, 52,581-606. 
Enns, M. W. & Cox, B../. (2005). Psychosocial and clinical predictors of symptom 
Persistence vs remission in major depressive disorder. Canadian Journal of 
P!,ychiatry, 50(12): 769-777. 
GaIotti, K.M., Ciner, E., Altenbaumer, H.E., Geerts, l-J../., Rupp, A., and Woulfe, J. 
(2006). Decision-making style in a real life decision: Choosing a college major. 
Personality and Individual Difference, 41,629-639. 
GaIotti, K.M. (2007). Decision structuring in important real-life choices. P;ychological 
Science, 18(4),320-325. 
64 
Gotlib, I.H., Kasch, K.L., Traill, S., Joorman,.1., Arnow, B.A., and Johnson, S.L. (2004). 
Coherence and specificity of information-processing biases in depression and 
social phobia. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 113(3),386-398. 
Gotlib, I.H., Yuc, D.N., and Joorman, J. (2005). Selective attention in dysphonic 
individuals: The role of affective interference and inhibition. Cognitive Therapy 
and Research, 29(4),417-432. 
Hastie, R. (2001). Problems for judgment and decision making. Annual Review (jf 
P;ychology, 52,653-683. 
Johnson, S.L., Joorman, .I., and Gotlib, I.H. (2007). Does processing of emotional stimuli 
Predict symptomatic improvement and diagnostic recovery l1'om major 
depression? Emotion, 7(1),201-206. 
Joorman, J., Siemer, M., and Gotlib, I.H. (2007). Mood regulation in depression: 
Differential effects of distraction and recall of happy memories on sad mood. 
Journal of Abnormal Plychology, 116(3),484-490. 
Judd, L.L. (1997). The clinical course of unipolar major depressive disorders. Archives (jf 
General P.lychiatry, 54, 989-991. 
Kessler, R.C., Chiu, W.T., Demler, 0., & Walters, E.E. (2005). Prevalence, severity, and 
Comorbidity oftweleve-month DSM-IV disorders in the National Co morbidity 
Survery Replication (NCS-R). Archives of General P;ychialry, 62(6): 617-627. 
Lewinsohn, S., and Mano, H. (1993). Multiattribute choice and affect: The influence of 
Naturally occurring and manipulated moods on choice processes. Journal of 
Behavioral Decision Making, 6,33-51. 
Loewenstein, G.F., Weber, E.U., Hsee, C.K., and Welch, N. (2001). Risk as feelings. 
P.lychological Bulletin, 127(2),267-286. 
Loo, R. (2000). A psychometric evaluation of the General Decision Making Style 
Inventory. Personality and Individual Differences, 29, 895-905. 
Martin, L.L. and Clore, G.L. (2001) Theories of Mood and Cognition. A User's 
Guidebook. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 
Mellers, B.A, Schwartz, A., and Cooke, ADJ. (1998). Judgment and decision making. 
Annual Reviews of Psychology, 49,447-477. 
65 
Metzger, R.L., Miller, M.L., Cohen, M., Sofl(a, M. et al. (1990) Worry changes decision 
making: The effect of negative thoughts on cognitive processing. Journal of 
Clinical P.lycholof,'Y, 46(1), 78-88. 
Nezu, Arthur M. (Editor). Practitioner's Guide to Empirically-Based Measures of 
Depression. Hingham, MA, USA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000. p 190. 
Nezu, A.M. (2004). Problem solving and behavior therapy revisited. Behavior Therapy, 
35,1-33. 
Nezu, AM,. and Ronan, G.F. (I 987). Social problem solving and depression: Deficits in 
generating alternatives and decision making. Southern P.lychologist, 3(1), 29-34. 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1991). Responses to depression and their effects on the duration of 
depressive episodes. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 100,569-582. 
Pham, M.T. (2007). Emotion and rationality: A critical review and interpretation of 
empirical evidence. Review of General P.lychology, 11(2), 155-178. 
Raghunathan, R., and Pham, M.T. (1999). All negative moods are not equal: 
Motivational 
intluences of anxiety and sadness on decision making. Organizational Behavior 
and Human Decision Processes, 79(1), 56-77. 
Roemer, L. and Orsillo, S.M. (2002). Expanding our conceptualization of and treatment 
for generalized anxiety disorder: Integrating mindfulness/acceptance-based 
approaches with existing cognitive-behavioral models. Clinical P.lycholof,'Y: 
Science and Practice, 9(1), 54-68. 
Scott, S.G., and Bruce, R.A. (1995). Decision-making style: the development and 
assessment of a new measure. Educational and Psychological Measures. 55(5), 
818-831. 
66 
Siegle, GJ., Ingram, R.E., and Matt, G.E. (2002). Affective interference: An explanation 
for negative attention biases in dysphoria? Cognitive Therapy and Research, 
26(1),73-87. 
Spicer, D.P., and Sadler-Smith, E. (2005). An examination of the general decision 
making style questionnaire in two UK samples. Journal ()f Managerial 
P.lychology, 20(2),137-149. 
The World Health Report (2004). Changing History, Annex Table 3: Burden of disease in 
DALYs by cause, sex, and mortality stratum in WHO regions, estimates for 2002. 
Geneva: WHO, 2004. 
Thunholm, P. (2004). Decision-making style: habit, style, or both? Individual and 
Personality Differences, 36, 931-944. 
Winkielman, P., Knutson, B., Paulus, M., and Trujillo, J.L. (2007). Aflective influence 
on judgments and decisions: Moving towards core mechanisms. Review ()f 
General P.lychology, 11 (2), 179-192. 
Zeelenberg, M. (1998). Emotional reactions to the outcomes of decisions: The role of 
Counterfactual thought in the experience ofregret and disappointment. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 75(2), 116-141. 
Subject's Name 
Appendix A: Informed Consent 
Drexel University 
Consent to Take Part 
In a Research Study 
2. Title of Research: The Relationship between Decision Making Style and Negative 
Affect in College Students 
3. Investigator's Name: Arthur Nezu, Ph.D., ABPP 
4. Research Entity: Drexel University. 
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5. Consenting for the Research Study: This is a long and an important document. If 
you sign it, you will be authorizing Drexel University and its researchers to perform 
research studies on you. You should take your time and carefully read it. You can also 
take a copy of this consent form to discuss it with your family member, attorney or 
anyone else you would like before you sign it. Do not sign it unless you are comfortable 
in participating in this study. 
6. Purpose of Research: 
You are being asked to participate in a research study. The purpose of this study is 
to find out more about the relationship between decision making processes and mood. 
You have been asked to take part in this study because the answers you provide on the 
questionnaires that will be given to you will help us to find out more about this 
relationship. Furthermore, I am a graduate psychology student doing this research project 
as a partial fulfillment to obtain my master's degree. There will be approximately 200 
subjects enrolled in this study at Drexel University. To participate you must be a full-time 
Drexel University student, between the ages of 18 and 29, and be able to read at a fifth 
grade reading level. You may discontinue participation at any point during the study for 
any reason. Any information you have given prior to discontinuing participation will not 
be used in the study. Furthermore, your choice to discontinue participation will not in any 
way cause you loss or harm 
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7. PROCEDURES AND DURATION: 
You understand that the following things will be done to you. If you choose to 
participate in this study, you will be asked to fill out a demographic form asking basic 
information about yourself, read one short vignette, and fill out three questionnaires, 
which ask questions about your decision making style and your current affective state. 
Upon filling out these questionnaires you might become emotional and/or upset because 
some of the questions ask about emotional experiences. Should you become upset please 
inform the investigator and the appropriate next step will be discussed. Should you agree 
to participate, approximately 15 to 30 minutes of your time will be required to complete 
the questionnaires that will be administered unless you decide to speak with the 
investigator about your experience in the study. Following completion of the 
questionnaires you will be given a debriefing form at which time you will have 
completed your participation in the study and receive extra credit for a psychology 
course. 
8. RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS/CONSTRAINTS: 
The potential risk in this study is that you will be exposed to questions that could 
possibly arouse negative emotions, sadness, or anxiety. This risk is minimal but should 
you feel uncomfortable at any point we are prepared to take you to the counseling center 
should you feel you need to talk to someone about your experience. You may stop filling 
out the questionnaires at any point and quit the study should you become upset or 
uncomtclltable. Should this happen your answers will not be used. 
9. UNFORESEEN RISKS: 
Participation in the study may involve unforeseen risks, such as an intense negative 
emotional reaction to the questionnaires. In the unlikely event that this should occur the 
investigator will be certain that you are directed to the proper personnel for debriefing 
and any other care necessary. If unforeseen risks are seen, they will be repOlted to the 
Office of Research Compliance. 
10. BENEFITS: 
There may be no direct benefit to the subject for participation in this study; 
however the investigators hope to learn ii'om your responses such that others can be 
helped in the future. 
11. ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES 
The alternative is not to participate in this study. 
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12. VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION: 
Volunteers: Participation in this study is voluntary, and you can refuse to be in the 
study or stop at any time. There will be no negative consequences if you decide not to 
participate or to stop. 
13. STIPENT/REIMBURSEMENT: 
You will receive extra credit toward a psychology course in the form of a signed 
paper indicating your participation in this study. 
14. CONFIDENTIALITY: 
In any publication or presentation of research results, your identity will be kept 
confidential,but there is a possibility that records which identify you may be 
inspected by the institutional review boards (lRBs), or persons conducting peer 
review activities. You consent to such inspections and to the copying of excerpts of 
your records, if required by any of these representatives. 
IS. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS: 
If you wish further information regarding your rights as a research subject or if 
you have problems with a research-related injury, for medical problems please contact 
the Institution's Office of Research Compliance by telephoning 215-762-3453. 
16. CONSENT: 
• I have been informed of the reasons for this study. 
• I have had the study explained to me. 
• I have had all of my questions answered. 
• I have carefully read this consent form, have initialed each page, and have 
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received a signed copy. 
• I give consent/permission voluntarily. 
Subject Date 
Investigator Date 
Witness to Signature Date 
List of Individuals Authorized to Obtain Consent/Permission 
Name Title Day }>hone # 24 Hr Phone # 
Arthur Nezu, Ph.D., ABPP Principle Investigator 215-762-4829 215-762-4829 
Annemarie Schoemaker Co-Investigator 609-306-5131 609-306-5131 
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Appendix B: Demographic Form 
Demographic Form 
Age 
Gender ____ _ 
Ethnicity 
Caucasian (non-hispanic) ____ _ 
Black ___ _ 
Asian 
----
Hispanic ____ _ 
European American ____ _ 
Other ___ _ 
Year in College (e.g. freshman, sophomore, junior, senior) ___ _ 
Major (e.g. business, psychology) _______ _ 
Have you ever received psychological counseling for depression or anxiety? Please circle 
yes or no. 
1) Anxiety: yes/no 
2) Depression: yes/no 
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Appendix C: Email to Psychology Students 
Email that will be sent periodically to introductory psychology student roster: 
Dear Student, 
I am a graduate student in the psychology department at Drexel University. I am 
conducting a study for my master's thesis looking at the relationship between mood and 
decision-making. I am looking for students willing to participate in this study. 
Patiicipation requires that you sign a consent form, fill out a demographic form, and 
provide answers on three questionnaires. In return for your participation you will receive 
one hour worth of extra credit that you can use towards your psychology course. 
Please email (afs36@!lrexel.edu) or call me (609-306-5131) if you are interested in 
participating in this study so that we can schedule a convenient time for you. Thank you 
in advance for your consideration. 
Sincerely, 
Annemarie Schoemaker 
Research Co-Investigator 
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Appendix D: Debriefing Form 
Thank you for your participation in this study. Our goal is to find out more about how 
you make decisions. To do this we wanted to learn more about the relationship between 
mood and decision making. Should you feel any discomfort following completion of the 
study or if you have any concerns about your participation in this study please contact the 
Principle Investigator or Co-Investigator listed below. Also, feel free to visit the student 
counseling center at Drexel University should you feel that you would like to talk to 
someone about these discomforts or concerns. Please let us know if you have any further 
questions. 
Principle Investigator 
Arthur Nezu, Ph.D., ABPP 
Phone: 215-762-4829 
E-mail: amn23@drexel.edu 
Co-Investigator 
Annemarie Schoemaker 
Phone: 609-306-5131 
E-mail: afs36(iildrexel.cdu 
Drexel University 
University City Counseling Center 
3141 Chestnut Street 
Philadelphia, P A 19104 
201 Creese Student Center 
Phone: (215) 895-1415 
E-mail: counseling@drexel.edu 
Appendix E:Vignette 
Imagine that you need to make a decision among a set of alternatives in which no 
alternative is ideal. The decision you need to make is regarding something extremely 
important, such as what to do once you complete your Bachelor's degree at Drexel. To 
your best ability, try to think about how you generally approach important decision as 
you fill out the questions that follow. 
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